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A PROPOSAL FOR REVISION OF THE FLORIDA
CONSTITUTION: ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
FOR FLORIDA CITIZENS
Although concern for the environment is not a product of the last
decade, it has gained widespread popular attention and has become a
major subject of both federal and state legislation only in the past
ten to fifteen years. The late 1960's and early 1970's brought with them
such federal legislation as the National Environmental Policy Act.'
Many state legislatures followed suit and enacted statutes similarly
designed to protect the environment.2
However, the effort to provide legal protection for the environment
has not focused solely on statutory protection. Increased interest in
preserving the environment has encouraged attempts to provide con-
stitutional protection-to place the maintenance of the environment
at the very foundation of the legal structure. While interest on the
federal level has been slight,3 several states have incorporated environ-
mental provisions into their constitutions.-
There are significant advantages to the inclusion of environmental
provisions in a state constitution as opposed to statutory treatment. The
primary distinction between a constitution and a statute or ordinance
is that a constitution includes the very fundamentals of government-
it is the organic document of a state. Inclusion of environmental pro-
tection in a state constitution places protection of the environment at
the highest level of state authority.5
Also, the amendment process for constitutional provisions is some-
what more difficult than is the repeal or amendment of statutes.6 Con-
stitutional amendments must ultimately be approved by the Florida
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1970).
2. E.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 380 (1975 & Supp. 1976), held unconstitutional in part, Cross
Key Waterways v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977; FLA. STAT.
§ 403.412 (1975).
3. Frye, Environmental Provisions in State Constitutions, 5 ENVT'L L. REP. 50028 &
nn.2 & 3 (1975); Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. REV. 193,
194 (1972).
4. These provisions include a wide range of approaches-from piecemeal provisions
dealing with a particular resource to broad statements directed toward the maintenance
of the environment as a whole. This note is concerned solely with provisions of the
latter type. These can be found at: ALAS. CONST. art. VIII; FA. CONST. art. II, § 7; GA.
CONsT. art. III, § 8; HAWAII CONsT. art. X, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. XI; LA. CONST. art. IX,
§ 1; MASS. CONsT. amend, art. 49; MICH. CONsT. art. 4, § 52; MONT. CONsT. art. IX, § 1;
N.M. CONST. art. XX, § 21; N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 4; N.C. CoNsT. art. XIV, § 5; PA.
CONsT. art. I, § 27; R.I. CONsT. amend. 37; TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 59(a); VA. CONST. art.
XI, § 1.
5. Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our Time, 54 VA. L.
REV. 928, 946 (1968).
6. Id.; Howard, supra note 3, at 196-97.
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citizenry while statutory amendments are subject only to approval by
the legislature and Governor. 7 Consequently, amendment of a constitu-
tional provision is generally less common than is amendment of a
statute.8
Florida became one of the states with a broad environmental pro-
vision when it adopted its 1968 constitution.9 Article II, section 7,
states, "[i]t shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its
natural resources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made
by law for the abatement of air and water pollution and of excessive
and unnecessary noise."'1
Article II, section 7, however, offers little substantive protection
for the environment. While the mandatory "shall" of the Florida pro-
vision may impose a moral obligation on Florida's legislature, such
an obligation is virtually unenforceable."
An attempt to obtain enforcement through the judiciary is likely
to fail on a separation of powers theory. The courts are a coordinate
branch of government and thus are not authorized to compel the legis-
lature to exercise a purely legislative prerogative. 12 Consequently, the
present environmental provision in the Florida Constitution does not
force the legislature to enact protective legislation. It merely en-
courages such protection.
Nor does article II, section 7, grant power to the legislature. The
state government, unlike its federal counterpart, is a government of
plenary powers, limited only by the state and federal constitutions.
While the United States Constitution represents a grant of power to
the federal government, state constitutions are documents of limita-
tion.1s Unless forbidden to legislate in the area by the federal constitu-
tion, the state legislature already has the authority, without a constitu-
tional grant or directive, to enact any legislation.14 Therefore, pro-
7. Compare FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 6-9 with FLA. CONST. art. XI.
8. Grad, supra note 5, at 946.
9. FLA. CONsT. art. II, § 7. The 1968 revision was the first revision of the Florida
Constitution since 1885.
10. Article II of the Florida Constitution is entitled "General Provisions." The
commentary for article I, § 7, stated that "[t]his section is an entirely new provision
which was added by the legislature and did not appear in the proposal submitted by
the Constitutional Revision Commission." Commentary appended to FLA. CONST. art. U,
§ 7, in 25A FLA. STAT. ANN. 530 (West 1970).
11. Sometimes the constitution in terms requires the legislature to enact laws
on a particular subject, and here it is obvious that the requirement has only a
moral force: the legislature ought to obey it; but the right intended to be given
is only assured when the legislation is voluntarily enacted.
I T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 165 (8th ed. 1927).
12. Brewer v. Gray, 86 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1956).
13. Peters v. Meeks, 163 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1964); Grad, supra note 5, at 966.
14. State v. Miller, 313 So. 2d 656, 658 (Fla. 1975).
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visions such as article II, section 7, which purport to grant power to
the legislature, actually grant no power not already possessed by the
legislature.
There may, in fact, be some danger in constitutional provisions
like that of Florida. In order to give state constitutional grants of
power some effect, courts have applied the maxim expressio unis est
exclusio alterius-the expression of one is the exclusion of another.15
Under this rule of construction, a negative implication would arise
when authorization is given for legislation on specific topics already
within the scope of the legislature's power. Areas not specifically
mentioned would be excluded from the lawmaking power of the legis-
lature. If a negative implication were drawn from article II, section 7,
legislative enactments in the field of natural resources and scenic beauty
could be restricted to laws "for the abatement of air and water pollu-
tion and of excessive and unnecessary noise." While, air, water, and
noise pollution may be the most publicized environmental threats,
they by no means represent an exhaustive list.16
However, Florida's present constitutional provision has not been
completely ineffective. Specifically pursuant to article II, section 7, the
legislature has enacted the Florida Environmental Land and Water
Management Act of 197217 and the Florida Motor Vehicle Noise Pre-
15. E.g., Interlachen Lake Estates, Inc. v. Snyder, 304 So. 2d 433, 434 (Fla. 1973) (list
of property classes in FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4, for which separate standards of tax valua-
tion may be established, is an exclusive list). See Grad, supra note 5, at 966.
16. For example, article II, § 7, as it is currently written, makes no express pro-
vision for consideration for Florida's forest and wildlife resources. Nor are historic and
aesthetic resources recognized in the provision.
17. FLA. STAT. ch. 380 (1975 & Supp. 1976), held unconstitutional in part, Cross
Key Waterways v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977). FLA. STAT. §
380.021 (1975) states:
It is the legislative intent that, in order to protect the natural resources and
environment of this state as provided in s. 7, Art. II of the State Constitution,
insure a water management system that will reverse the deterioration of water
quality and provide optimum utilization of our limited water resources, facilitate
orderly and well-planned development, and protect the health, welfare, safety,
and quality of life of the residents of this state, it is necessary adequately to plan
for and guide growth and development within this state. In order to accomplish
these purposes, it is necessary that the state establish land and water management
policies to guide and coordinate local decisions relating to growth and development;
that such state land and water management policies should, to the maximum
possible extent, be implemented by local governments through existing processes
for the guidance of growth and development; and that all the existing rights of
private property be preserved in accord with the constitutions of this state and
of the United States.
The Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975 is specifically intended
to further the purposes of chapter 380. FLA. STAT. § 163.3161(2) (1975). For a brief dis-
cussion of the act, see text accompanying notes 71-77 infra.
1977]
812 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.5:809
vention and Control Act of 1974.18 Florida courts have, though infre-
quently, cited the provision as lending strength to a pro-environmental
argument. 9 But the provision has not provided an independent basis
on which environmental protection could be advocated in court. In
particular, it fails to recognize any right of Florida citizens to a clean
and healthful environment.
Environmental provisions in the constitutions of other states have,
for the most part, provided no greater substantive protection than
has Florida's article II, section 7. The majority of these provisions are
policy statements and offer no independent basis on which environ-
mental threats may be judicially challenged.20 There are exceptions,
however. In five states, citizens have constitutionally protected rights
to a decent environment: Illinois,21 Massachusetts 2  Pennsylvania, 3
18. FLA. STAT. §§ 403.415-.4153 (1975 & Supp. 1976). FLA. STAT. § 403.415(2)(a) (Supp.
1976) states:
The intent of the legislature is to implement the state constitutional mandate of
s. 7, Art. II of the State Constitution to improve the quality of life in the state
by limiting the noise of new motor vehicles sold in the state and the noise of
motor vehicles used on the highways of the state.
19. Two notable examples are Seadade Indus., Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co.,
245 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1971), and Askew v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 336 So. 2d
556 (Fla. 1976). In Seadade, the Supreme Court of Florida stated that, in condemnation
proceedings by public utilities, the need for public works must be balanced against
the policy stated in article II, § 7. 245 So. 2d at 214. The court found that the balance
in the case weighed in favor of the utility company.
In Askew, the Florida Supreme Court considered an apparent conflict among several
statutes which allowed the Department of Natural Resources to introduce an exotic
fish into Florida waters for the purpose of controlling aquatic weeds, and article IV, §
9, of the constitution which established the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission
as the regulatory agency with authority over fresh water aquatic life. The court found
that the statutes in question were necessary for full implementation of article II, § 7.
Therefore, since the constitutional provisions should be interpreted to complement rather
than contradict one another, the statutes were not unconstitutional. 336 So. 2d at 560.
20. While the Michigan environmental provision seems to grant no greater substantive
rights than Florida's, at least one Michigan court has interpreted the provision as
constitutional recognition of a public trust over the state's natural resources. MacMullan
v. Babcock, 196 N.W.2d 489, 497 (Mich. 1972).
21. ILL. CONST. art. XI states:
§ 1. Public Policy-Legislative Responsibility
The public policy of the State and the duty of each person is to provide and
maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this and future generations.
The General Assembly shall provide by law for the implementation and enforce-
ment of this public policy.
§ 2. Rights of Individuals
Each person has the right to a healthful environment. Each person may enforce
this right against any party, governmental or private, through appropriate legal
proceedings subject to reasonable limitation and regulation as the General
Assembly may provide by law.
22. MASS. CONsT. amend, art 49 states:
The people shall have the right to clean air and water, freedom from excessive
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Rhode Island,2 4 and Texas.2 5 The courts of three of these states-
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Texas-have not had occasion to
apply their environmental rights provisions, but a look at the court
treatment of the Illinois and Pennsylvania provisions indicates some
of the benefits and various weaknesses in the particular provisions
enacted by those states.
Illinois' environmental provision has three major elements: (1) a
and unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic qualities of
their environment; and the protection of the people in their right to the con-
servation, development and utilization of the agricultural, mineral, forest, water,
air and other natural resources is hereby declared to be a public purpose.
The general court shall have the power to enact legislation necessary or ex-
pedient to protect such rights.
In the furtherance of the foregoing powers, the general court shall have the
power to provide for the taking, upon payment of just compensation therefor, or
for the acquisition by purchase or otherwise, of lands and easements or such other
interests therein as may be deemed necessary to accomplish these purposes.
Lands and easements taken or acquired for such purposes shall not be used for
other purposes or otherwise disposed of except by laws enacted by a two thirds
vote, taken by yeas and nays, of each branch of the general court.
23. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 states:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of
the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's
public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
24. R.I. CONST. amend. 37, § 1, states:
Article I, § 17 of the state constitution is hereby amended by striking out this
said section as it now appears and inserting in place thereof the following new
section:
"§ 17. The people shall continue to enjoy and freely exercise all the rights
of fishery, and the privileges of the shore, to which they have been heretofore
entitled under the charter and usages of this state; and they shall be secure in
their rights to use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the state with due
regard for the preservation of their values; and it shall be the duty of the general
assembly to provide for the conservation of the air, land, water, plant, animal,
mineral and other natural resources of the state, and to adopt all means necessary
and proper by law to protect the natural environment of the people of the state
by providing adequate resource planning for the control and regulation of the
use of the natural resources of the state and for the preservation, regeneration
and restoration of the natural environment of the state."
25. TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 59(a), states:
The conservation and development of all of the natural resources of this
State, including the control, storing, preservation and distribution of its storm
and flood waters, the waters of its rivers and streams, for irrigation, power and
all other useful purposes, the reclamation and irrigation of its arid, semi-arid and
other lands needing irrigation, the reclamation and drainage of its overflowed
lands, and other lands needing drainage, the conservation and development of its
forests, water and hydro-electric power, the navigation of its inland and coastal
waters, and the preservation and conservation of all such natural resources of the
State are each and all hereby declared public rights and duties; and the Legisla-
ture shall pass all such laws as may be appropriate thereto.
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policy statement and legislative directive not unlike Florida's, (2) a
right to a healthful environment enforceable by individuals, and (3) a
corresponding duty of both the state and individuals to provide and
maintain the environment.26 While the duty provision is included in
the Illinois policy statement section, it could be interpreted as the
basis for an environmental suit for breach of a constitutional duty;
however, the Illinois duty clause is still untested. 27
The rights provision has been tested. Illinois courts appear willing
to apply article XI of the Illinois Constitution if substantiating facts
are available. For instance, in Scattering Fork Drainage District v.
Ogilvie,21 the court dismissed a complaint seeking an injunction against
construction along an Illinois river. Nevertheless, the court stressed
the absence of supporting facts rather than a general unwillingness
to apply Illinois' environmental provision.29 Similarly, in Parsons v.
Walker,3° in which citizens sought to enjoin university trustees from
agreeing to the construction of a reservoir, an Illinois court recognized
that individuals have standing to bring suit under article XI. The
case is particularly significant since the problem of establishing stand-
ing has long vexed environmental advocates."
Under the common law in most states, environmental suits are
often based on a nuisance theory. Individuals wishing to bring a suit
to prevent environmental harm or to seek compensation for such harm
must show that they have suffered a special injury-that the damage to
their interest is in some way distinct and separate from the damage to
the interests of the public in general.3 2 The Parsons court found that
article XI removed the special injury requirement."
Illinois courts have also applied article XI of the Illinois Constitu-
tion to bar the defense of estoppel. In Tri-County Landfill Co. v.
Illinois Pollution Control Board, 4 the court disallowed the defense of
estoppel by a landfill company charged with violation of an Illinois
environmental statute even though the landfills in question were
authorized by the Pollution Control Board's predecessor. The court
26. See note 21 supra. For a brief discussion of the potential impact of a duty
clause, see Frye, supra note 3, at 50033.
27. For a good discussion of this interpretation of ILL. CoNsr. art. XI, see Howard,
supra note 3, at 202.
28. 311 N.E.2d 203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
29. Id. at 210.
30. 328 N.E.2d 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
31. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
32. 1 V. YANNACONE & B. COHEN, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS & REMEDIES 81 (1971). The
special injury rule is applied by Florida courts. See text accompanying notes 55-60 infra.
33. 328 N.E.2d at 927.
34. 353 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
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found estoppel inapplicable since the defense would deny the peti-
tioners their constitutional right to a healthful environment 5
Although article XI grants the right to "each person" and specifically
provides for citizen enforcement of environmental rights, Illinois
courts have not yet considered the merits of such citizen suits.38 In
fact, the Illinois Constitutional Convention apparently feared that
article XI would encourage a flood of such suits.3 7 Thus, the phrase
"subject to such reasonable limitation and regulation as the General
Assembly may provide by law" was added to the environmental right
section to allow control of the number of environmental suits reach-
ing the courts. It was expected that the legislature's regulations
would include a law which required the individual to file any en-
vironmental claims with the Attorney General and that only if he
did not act could the individual file suits; a law creating an adminis-
trative agency in which all claims against pollutors would have to
be filed, with judicial review provisions; the creation of a special
court, such as a traffic court, which would handle all pollution suits;
or a law requiring that all pollution suits be brought by the Attorney
General with the individual's right to intervene.38
Still, the limitations placed on citizen participation must be reason-
able and, presumably, the citizen enforcement provision would allow
individual citizens to bring suits if the government fails to do so? 9
In contrast, Pennsylvania's environmental rights provision, article
I, section 27, grants the rights to "the people" and refers to the state
as trustee of the environment. Such language does not support in-
dividual enforcement of the right; rather, the state is granted standing
to bring suits under a public trust theory.40
The public trust doctrine has long been a basis for environmental
suits. 41 The doctrine stands for the precept that the thing held in
trust is owned by all in common, rather than by any individual or
group of individuals. 42 The state holds the trust property as trustee
35. Id. at 322.
36. Parsons is a possible exception. The Parsons suit was brought by citizens. The
Illinois court dismissed counts I-VIII, the article XI causes of action, on the basis that
the suit was premature. 328 N.E.2d at 924-25. Count IX was held to state a cause of
action, but rested on non-article XI grounds. Id. at 926-27.
37. Frye, supra note 3, at 50031-32.
38. Constitutional commentary accompanying ILL. CONST. art. II, § 2, quoted in
Frye, supra note 3, at 50031-32.
39. Frye, supra note 3, at 50031-32.
40. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battle Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588, 592
(Pa. 1973); Frye, supra note 3, at 50031.
41. 1 V. YANNACONE & B. COHEN, supra note 32, at 11-44.
42. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 526 (1896).
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for the benefit of the people. The people may assert the public trust
doctrine to ensure that the state protects and maintains the common
property for the common good.43 While the Pennsylvania environ-
mental provision does not create an entirely new basis for environ-
mental suits, it does strengthen and ensure the application of the
public trust doctrine. The constitutional public trust is less subject to
statutory or judicial restriction than if it were merely a common law
trust.
Although Pennsylvania's provision does not appear to be self-
executing on its face, that state's courts have held that it is. If an
article is self-executing, it may be enforced without further legislation.
It requires no further definition by the legislature.4 4 In Common-
wealth v. National Gettysburg Battle Tower, Inc.,45 a Pennsylvania
court reasoned that article I, section 27, is a declaration of an inalterably
established right, requiring no more definition by the legislature than
do provisions declaring freedoms of speech or religion. Further, the
court reasoned that the concepts of clean air and water and natural,
scenic, historic, and esthetic values are less vague than terms found in
other self-executing provisions.4 6
However, the Pennsylvania courts have impeded enforcement of
the trust by other means. In Payne v. Kassab, 4 the court stated that
it would be
difficult to imagine any activity in the vicinity [of an historic town
common] . . . that would not offend the interpretation of Article I,
Section 27 which plaintiffs urge on us. We hold that Section 27 was
intended to allow the normal development of property in the
Commonwealth, while at the same time constitutionally affixing a
public trust concept to the management of public natural resources
of Pennsylvania. The result of our holding is a controlled develop-
ment of resources rather than no development.48
43. 1 V. YANNACONE & B. COHEN, supra note 32, at 11-15.
44. 1 T. COOLEY, supra note 11, at 165-72; Howard, supra note 3, at 207-09.
45. 302 A.2d 886 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), aft'd, 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973).
46. 302 A.2d at 892. While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed this decision,
there was disagreement over the issue of self-execution. The writer of the majority
opinion asserted that the provision was not self-executing; he was joined by one other
justice. Only two other justices expressed views on self-execution, and they reached the
opposite conclusion. 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973). Pennsylvania courts have adopted the
conclusion of the lower court-that article I, § 27, is self-executing. Community College
v. Fox, 342 A.2d 468, 474 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974); Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 &
n.2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
47. 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
48. Id. at 94.
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
The Payne court delineated a three part test to determine whether
the environmental danger outweighs the benefits of development:
(1) Are all relevant statutes and regulations complied with? (2) Are
reasonable efforts made to minimize the environmental harm and
does the record reflect these efforts? (3) Does the threatened environ-
mental harm so outweigh the social benefits that proceeding further
would be an abuse of discretion?49 If these considerations show that
the requisite procedures were not followed or the social benefits do
not outweigh the environmental threat, article I, section 27, requires
a halt to the threatening activity.
Clearly, the judicial applications of the Pennsylvania and Illinois
provisions provide three major benefits. First, the provisions them-
selves provide a basis on which suits may be brought; second, their in-
clusion in the state constitutions promises some permanency for an
environmentally protective attitude; third, the provisions include
recognition of citizens' rights to a decent environment.
Revision of Florida's current environmental provision could yield
benefits, if not greater than those felt in Illinois and Pennsylvania, at
least equal to them. The principle of environmental rights would be
elevated to a more permanent and fundamental level. The protections
currently offered by statutory provisions could be expanded by a
constitutional provision.
The major state statutory protections for the entire environment
available to Florida citizens are the Environmental Protection Act
of 1971 (EPA),50 the Florida Environmental Land and Water Manage-
ment Act of 1972 (Land Management Act),51 its corollary, the Local
Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975 (Local Planning
Act),52 and the Florida Administrative Procedure Act (APA).53 EPA
states that "[t]he Department of Legal Affairs, any political subdivision
or municipality of the state, or a citizen of the state may maintain an
action for injunctive relief" to compel enforcement of environmental
49. Id. The court concluded that the benefits of widening a street through the
River Common outweighed the harmful effects, which included encroachment of a half
acre of land, removal of trees and elimination of a pedestrian walk. More far-reaching
considerations were required by Pennsylvania's Environmental Hearing Board in Com-
munity College v. Fox, 342 A.2d 468 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
For a good discussion of the Gettysburg Tower-Payne-Community College line of
cases, see Pearson & Hutton, Land Use in Pennsylvania: Any Change Since the En-
vironmental Rights Amendment?, 14 DuQ. L. REV. 165, 185-203 (1975-76).
50. FLA. STAT. § 403.412 (1975).
51. Id. ch. 380 (1975 & Supp. 1976), held unconstitutional in part, Cross Key Water-
ways v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
52. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3211 (1975 & Supp. 1976).
53. Id. ch. 120.
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laws and regulations and enjoin their violation.5" Neither the statute
itself nor court treatment of the statute clarifies whether citizens bring-
ing suit must show a special injury. As discussed earlier, under the
special injury rule a person has standing to sue only if he can show
some private injury which is separate and independent from any injury
to the interests of the public at large.55
Only one case specifically dealing with the applicability of the
special injury rule has been reported. The Second District Court of
Appeal, in Save Our Bay, Inc. v. Hillsborough County Pollution Con-
trol Commission,"6 held that the plaintiff organization was not required
to show special injury.. 7 But the court relied on an earlier Second
District case, United States Steel Co. v. Save Sand Key, 5 in reaching
this conclusion. Subsequently, the Florida Supreme Court reversed
Save Sand Key and specifically declared that Florida law requires
special injury.51 However, Save Sand Key was a public nuisance case.
Arguably, the decision only indicates the supreme court's unwilling-
ness to dispense with the special injury rule for public nuisance cases;
Save Sand Key may not be binding precedent for EPA actions. Thus
it is unsettled whether special injury is required for citizen standing
under EPA.60
To this uncertainty are added several definite shortcomings of
EPA. First, EPA has no provision for the recompense of injury already
incurred. The only remedy available under the Act is injunctive re-
lief.61 Second, the EPA complainant may be required to post bond.62
While the bond requirement rests in the court's discretion, the exercise
of the discretion hinges on the complainant's ability to pay costs and
attorney's fees if the respondent prevails. 63 This solvency requirement
54. Id. § 403.412(2)(a) (1975).
55. See text accompanying notes 30-33 supra. At least one source argues that EPA's
specific grant of standing would have no meaning if the special injury rule is applicable,
since such limited standing already existed at common law. Note, The Florida Environ-
mental Protection Act of 1971: The Citizen's Role in Environmental Management, 2 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 736, 755 (1974). If the special injury rule is designed to avoid multiplicity
of lawsuits, the specific application of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel
to EPA suits should achieve the desired effect. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(4) (1975), specifically
makes those doctrines applicable to EPA suits and mandates court orders "to avoid
multiplicity of actions."
56. 285 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
57. Id. at 449.
58. 281 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973), rev'd, 303 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
59. 303 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
60. A corporation is considered a citizen for purposes of bringing a suit under the
EPA. Orange County Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Hold, 276 So. 2d 542, 543 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1973).
61. See FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2)(a) (1975).
62. Id. § 403.412(2)(f).
63. Id.
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
may effectively restrict the number of individual citizens able to bring
an EPA suit. On the other hand, such a bond may discourage a multi-
plicity of law suits. Third, a citizen may not bring an EPA suit if
the offending party is in compliance with a valid government permit.64
A valid permit supplies a solid defense-leaving the complaining citizen
to challenge the validity of the permit or the legality of the permitting
agency's actions. 65 Fourth, before a suit may be filed in court on the
basis of EPA, the complainant must seek administrative relief.66
Finally, only violation or nonenforcement of specific state laws, rules,
or regulations warrants an EPA suit.6 7 Actions which threaten the en-
vironment, but violate no existing environmental law, could not be
challenged on the basis of EPA.
The Land Management Act68 and the Local Planning Act 69 pro-
vide that regulations and ordinances protective of the environment
shall be adopted by state and local governments. The former desig-
nates developments of regional impact which, because of their
"character, magnitude, or location, would have a substantial effect
upon the health, safety, or welfare of citizens of more than one
county. '" 70 In addition, the Land Management Act provides for the
utilization of regional land planning agencies.7 1
64. Id. § 403.412(2)(e).
65. Seadade Indus., Inc. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 245 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1971), may
provide an effective means of challenging a permit's validity. The decision indicates
that, unless environmental factors are balanced against other factors, the administrative
agency's actions may be invalid. Seadade dealt with the actions of a condemnation board,
but the decision's logic should carry over to other agencies.
66. FLA. STAT. § 403A12(2)(c) (1975). However, failure to first seek administrative
remedies does not bar an action for a temporary restraining order when immediate and
irreparable harm is threatened. Id.
67. Id. § 403.412(1)-(2).
68. Id. ch. 380 (1975 & Supp. 1976), held unconstitutional in part, Cross Key Water-
ways v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
69. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3211 (1975 & Supp. 1976).
70. Id. § 380.06(1) (Supp. 1976).
71. Id. § 380.031(3) (1975).
The Act provides for the Florida Administration Commission to designate areas of
critical state concern. Id. § 380.05 (Supp. 1976). However, the First District Court of
Appeal in Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1977), found this provision an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. The
legislature may reclaim regulatory powers from local governments and reassign them to
the state. Id. at 1065. But it may not pass a vague law and then delegate to a state agency
the authority to determine what the vague law means. Id. at 1068. The court of appeal
stated that the statutory limitations on the Administration Commission's designation of
areas of critical state concern were too vague. In essence, § 380.05 allowed the state
agency to restructure Florida government. Id.
However, Cross Key Waterways suggests that, if proper statutory standards are
established, the designation of critical areas could be valid. In fact, the court suggests
its approval of § 380.06 which provides for the designation of developments of regional
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The Local Planning Act requires municipal and county govern-
ment to engage in comprehensive land use planning.72 Environmental
factors are among those elements which must be considered in framing
a comprehensive plan.7 3 Procedures for public participation in the
planning process are determined by local planning agencies but must
meet the minimum requirements set out in the statute.74 These pro-
cedures require "broad dissemination" of proposals, opportunity for
comment and public notice of proposed ordinances.
75
While the procedures for public input into local planning will vary
according to local ordinances, the Land Management Act is subject
to the procedures established by Florida's APA. 76 APA requires that
certain procedures be followed before a state agency adopts a rule or
issues an order. The required procedures are designed to allow signifi-
cant input from private citizens. Any "substantially affected person may
seek an administrative determination" of any proposed rule's validity
77
and any person "having a substantial interest in an agency rule may
petition an agency to adopt, amend, or repeal a rule ... ,"78 In addition,
parties whose substantial interests are determined by an agency may re-
quest an administrative hearing to review an agency order,7 9 or issuance
of a permit by an agency.8 °
By means of the APA, an environmentally concerned citizen may
increase the probability that the spirit of the EPA and the Land
Management Act will be followed. For instance, any person with a
substantial interest may petition an appropriate agency to adopt a
rule which would protect the environment. The agency must then
impact. Id. at 1069 & n.16. While the guidelines for developments of regional impact
designation are adopted by the Administration Commission, they are subject to the
approval or disapproval of the legislature. FLA. STAT. § 380.10 (1975).
72. FLA. STAT. § 163.3167 (1975). Comprehensive plans must be adopted by July 1,
1979. Id.
73. Id. § 163.3177.
74. Id. § 163.3181 (Supp. 1976). Possibly, however, the argument could be made
that the APA is also applicable to local planning agencies. See text accompanying note
94 infra.
75. Id.
76. Id. § 120.52(1)(b) (Supp. 1976). For a good summary of APA see Dore, Rule-
making Innovations Under the New Administrative Procedure Act, 3 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 97 (1975).
77. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4)(a) (Supp. 1976).
78. Id. § 120.54(5).
79. Id. § 120.57. The statute distinguishes between a rule and an order. Section
120.52(14) defines "rule" as "each agency statement of general applicability that imple-
ments, interprets, or prescribes law . . . . The term also includes the amendment or
repeal of a rule." Section 120.52(9) defines "order" as "a final agency decision which does
not have the effect of a rule .... whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declara-
tory in form."
80. Id. § 120.60.
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institute rulemaking proceedings or deny the petition with a written
explanation. 81 The decision not to institute rulemaking proceedings
is final agency action 2 and may be reviewed as a matter of right in a
district court of appeal.8 3 Alternatively, a party whose substantial in-
terests are determined by an agency may request an administrative
hearing.84 A party is a person whose substantial interests are affected
and who is either specifically named in the proceeding or is entitled
by law or allowed by the agency to participate in the proceedings. 5
Parties adversely affected by the outcome of the proceedings 6 are
entitled to review by a district court of appeal.8 7 The APA also pro-
vides for declaratory statements by an agency as to the applicability
of any statute, rule, or order.8 "
APA allows any person substantially affected by an agency action
to challenge that action administratively. 9 A Florida district court
of appeal, in City of Key West v. Askew, 90 distinguished the "sub-
stantially affected" requirement from the special injury rule. Citing
former section 120.52(9)(c),91 the court found that, unless an agency
authorizes limited participation by rule, individuals requesting
participation may not be refused full participation. Each such in-
dividual, therefore, would have full standing as a party, be authorized
to request hearings and, if adversely affected by the hearing, seek
judicial review. Where agencies have not provided for limited
81. Id. § 120.54(5).
82. Id. § 120.52(2).
83. Id. § 120.68(1).
84. Id. § 120.57.
85. Id. § 120.52(10).
86. "Agency action" is defined as "the whole or part of a rule or order, or the
equivalent, or the denial of a petition to adopt a rule or issue an order." Id. § 120.52(2).
87. Id. § 120.68. Where specifically provided by law, review shall be by the supreme
court. Id. § 120.68(2).
88. Id. § 120.565.
89. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(10) (Supp. 1976) provides that any person "who, as a matter
of constitutional right, provision of statute, or provision of agency regulation, is entitled
to participate in whole or in part in the proceeding, or whose substantial interests will
be affected by proposed agency action, and who makes an appearance as a party" is a
party. Therefore, substantially affected persons who participate in agency proceedings
are treated as parties and may request a hearing under § 120.57.
90. 324 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976). The City of Key West, a labor
union, and 300 named individuals and businesses had standing to challenge the rule
designating Monroe County an area of critical state concern under chapter 380, Florida
Statutes.
91. Subsequent revision of chapter 120 has included a renumbering of § 120.52.
The provision, now numbered as § 120.52(10)(c), provides that the definition of party
also includes "[a]ny other person . . . allowed by the agency to intervene or participate
in the proceeding as a party. An agency may, by rule, authorize limited forms of participa-
tion in agency proceedings for persons who are not eligible to become parties."
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participation, APA offers citizens a means to challenge agency action
threatening the environment or to force agency action to prevent en-
vironmental harm.
Such broad-based citizen standing is not guaranteed, however.
92
While agencies have not promulgated rules restricting participation,
they may do so in the future. The presence of a constitutional right
to a clean and healthful environment would ensure standing under
section 120.52(10)(b) 3 -to "[a]ny other person who, as a matter of
constitutional right, . . . is entitled to participate ...."
In addition, it is not entirely clear whether APA applies to local
planning agencies. Although the Local Planning Act indicates that the
procedures for public participation are to be determined by local
agencies, the APA specifically states that "agency" includes "each com-
mission, regional planning agency, board, district, and authority in-
cluding, but not limited to those described in chapters 160, 163, 298,
373, 380 and 582."14 Both statutes have been recently amended. In
fact, the minimum procedures outlined in the Local Planning Act
were first adopted in 1976.15 The particular provision of the APA
including chapter 163 was adopted in 1974,96 before the Local Planning
Act was enacted.9 7 Since the language in the APA is not entirely clear,
it is arguable that the APA applies only to those sections of chapter
163 in effect when the APA was drafted and became law. Conse-
quently, the specific language of the Land Planning Act would pre-
vail.
A further consideration is that Florida courts require a complain-
ant to first exhaust administrative remedies before taking his com-
plaint to court.98 This requirement prevents a flood of suits and
92. An example of the broad-based standing currently available is that provided
by the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation which gives an opportunity to
be heard to all affected parties and the public in general. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 17-1.06(2).
93. (Supp. 1976).
94. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(l) (Supp. 1976) defines an agency as:
(a) The governor in the exercise of all executive powers other than those
derived from the Constitution.
(b) Each other state officer and each state department, departmental unit
described in s. 20.04, commission, regional planning agency, board, district, and
authority, including but not limited to those described in chapters 160, 163, 298,
373, 380 and 582.
(c) Each other unit of government in the state, including counties and munici-
palities to the extent they are expressly made subject to this act by general or
special law or existing judicial decisions.
95. Act of June 16, 1976, ch. 76-155 § 3, 1976 Fla. Laws 275.
96. Act of June 25, 1974, ch. 74-310, § 1, 1974 Fla. Laws 953.
97. Act of June 30, 1975, ch. 75-258, 1975 Fla. Laws 811.
98. Ace Delivery Serv. v. Boyd, 100 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1958); City of Coral Gables
v. Sakolsky, 215 So. 2d 329, 334-35 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968). Cf. School Board v. Hauser,
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allows state agencies to administer the day-to-day regulation of the
environment since the administrative review process can be time con-
suming. However, it is not clear how effective the APA would be in
situations requiring immediate action. 9
The APA does provide immediate relief when an agency finds an
immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare."' 0 The re-
sulting emergency rule remains in effect for no longer than ninety days
and is not renewable. 1' The emergency rule provision, however, may
not be a sufficient solution when it is a state agency's own action which
is the threat.
Additionally, provision is made for a stay of an agency decision,
either by the agency itself or by the reviewing court, i.e., the district
court of appeal. 0 2 Filing of a petition for review does not automatically
stay an agency decision. With an exception not here relevant, the
granting of a stay would be discretionary with the agency or the
district court of appeal.
Section 120.73, Florida Statutes,l0 3 preserves the right to proceed
in circuit court "in lieu of an administrative hearing" and to seek a
declaratory judgment in circuit court. That provision has been given
a restrictive reading.
In a recent opinion, Department of General Services v. Willis,104
the First District Court of Appeal held that a circuit court does not
have jurisdiction, under normal circumstances, to enjoin administra-
tive action. The court emphasized that, while a circuit court retains
its authority to enjoin administrative action, an injunction is an extra-
ordinary writ, appropriate only when normal legal avenues are inade-
quate. 105 Since APA provides an alternative remedy, the need for the
extraordinary writ of injunction is lessened.0 6
293 So. 2d 681, 683 (Fla. 1974) (teacher who was not rehired must exhaust administrative
remedies before bringing a declaratory judgment action). But see City of Miami Beach
v. Jonathan Corp., 238 So. 2d 516, 518 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (administrative remedies
need not be exhausted if it is clear that any further action or appeal would be un-
necessary or useless).
99. For instance, if a citizen petitions an agency to promulgate a rule the agency
has 30 days in which to initiate rulemaking proceedings. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4) (Supp.
1976). After the agency drafts a proposed rule, it cannot take action to finalize the rule
before giving 21 days notice. Id. § 120.54(l)(b).
While the judicial system may not proceed with any greater speed, a citizen may
seek a temporary restraining order or an injunction if harm is imminent.
100. Id. § 120.54(9).
101. Id. § 120.54(9)(c).
102. Id. § 120.68(3).
103. (1975).
104. 344 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
105. Id. at 589-90.
106. Id. at 590.
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However, the Willis court suggested two circumstances in which
injunctive relief could be appropriate: (1) where "agency errors may
be so egregious or devastating that the promised administrative remedy
is too little or too late, ' '10 7 and (2) where an agency rule is facially
unconstitutional. 08 In view of the latter suggestion, the existence of a
constitutional right to a decent environment could make injunctive
relief available when an agency sought to enforce a rule violating the en-
vironmental right.
The Willis court did not deal with stays granted by an agency. The
statute provides that an agency may be petitioned to grant a stay. The
denial of that stay would permit an interlocutory petition for review
to be presented directly to a district court of appeal. 0 9
Under present law, such immediate danger might be forestalled by
suit for abatement of a public nuisance under section 60.05, Florida
Statutes."" This provision permits a citizen of a county to sue in the
name of the state to enjoin a public nuisance. A public nuisance is
defined in section 823.05 Florida Statutes, 1" as "any building, booth,
tent, or place which tends to annoy the community or injure the health
of the community, or become manifestly injurious to the morals or
manners of the people . . . ." The special injury requirement is,
effectively removed if the citizen sues in the state's behalf rather than
his own." 2 Section 60.05 suits, unlike actions under APA, may be
brought against municipalities. Unlike actions under EPA "a given
activity can constitute a judicially abatable nuisance notwithstanding
full compliance with either legislative mandate or administrative
rule."113 However, the definition of public nuisance is not broad
enough to allow a suit under section 60.05 to enjoin agency action or
inaction. In addition, the only remedy available is an injunction; no
compensation is available for damages already incurred."14
Damages are available, however, under the Florida Air and Water
Pollution Control Act.115 This Act allows the Department of Environ-
mental Regulation to seek civil damages of up to $5,000 for each day
of violation with the Act. 1 Violations include "causing pollution so as
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(1) (Supp. 1976).
110. (1975).
111. (1975).
112. National Container Corp. v. Stockton, 189 So. 4, 13 (Fla. 1939); Gardner v.
Sailboat Key, Inc., 295 So. 2d 658, 660 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
113. Shevin v. Tampa Elec. Co., 291 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974). See
also Gardner v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 295 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
114. FLA. STAT. § 60.05(1) (1975).
115. Id. §§ 403.011-.4152 (1975 & Supp. 1976).
116. Id. § 403.121(l)(b) (1975).
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to harm or injure human health or welfare, animal, plant, or aquatic
life or property."'1 7 The Act does not provide for damages in actions
brought by private individuals, however.
Clearly, the protections offered by section 60.05, the EPA, the Land
Management Act, the Local Planning Act, and the APA can be fairly
effective. But their effectiveness could be expanded if Florida were to
adopt a constitutional provision recognizing a right to a decent environ-
ment. As mentioned earlier, constitutional provisions generally offer
more permanence than do statutory provisions. While the present en-
vironmental statutes offer significant protections, they could be repealed
during any legislative session. A constitutional provision offering en-
vironmental protection could not be repealed or amended without
approval by Florida's citizens. The existence of such a constitutional
provision, therefore, would offer an assurance that the present level of
statutory protection would not decline.
In view of the ineffectiveness of Florida's present constitutional
provision regarding the environment and the potential benefits of a
provision granting enforceable rights, the following revision is pro-
posed:
The people of the State, of both the present and future genera-
tions, have the right to a healthful environment. As trustee for the
people, the State shall protect the environment and enforce the
right of the people in it. Any citizen may enforce the right on behalf
of the State, or upon refusal of the State to enforce the right
recognized in this provision, any citizen may bring an action against
the State for breach of trust. Any damages awarded in a suit for
the enforcement of this right shall be deposited in a trust fund
held by the State expressly designated for correction of damage
done to the environment of the State." 8
Using the term "[t]he people of the State," the proposal above
recognizes that the right to protection and preservation of the en-
vironment is a right held in common by all people in the State. No
one person's right of enjoyment or use takes precedence over the
common good of all-including future generations. Conflicting in-
terests have to be resolved with regard to the interests of the public
as a whole, but, as specifically provided, the interests of as yet unborn
members of the public must also be considered." 9 In essence, this is a
117. Id. § 403.161(1)(a).
118. This proposal is primarily patterned after the present constitutional provisions
of Illinois and Pennsylvania. See notes 21 & 23 supra.
119. Consequently, balancing similar to that in Seadade would not be completely
discarded. Rather, greater weight would be given to both the environmental right of
1977]
826 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.5:809
restatement of the public trust doctrine. But a constitutionally
guaranteed right to a clean environment elevates the trust doctrine
to a principle of organic law.
The scope of the right is purposely general. While the meaning of
"a healthful environment" is not perfectly clear, such language allows
interpreting courts to give the provision a wide scope. Future revisions
of this phrase are unlikely since all future environmental threats may
be combatted on the grounds of maintaining "a healthful environ-
ment."
120
Each citizen holds an equitable interest in the environment under
the proposed revision. The provision removes the special injury re-
quirement, making it possible for each citizen to enforce the public
interest. Similarly the present APA allows citizens to seek enforcement
of agency actions. Two methods are provided for citizen enforcement
of the right: (1) an action on behalf of the State, such as that now
available under sections 60.05 and 120.69, Florida Statutes, or (2) an
action against the State for failure to fulfill its duties as trustee.
The State could violate the trust by acting as a direct polluter
itself or by failing to adequately regulate private polluters. Citizen
suits on the individual's own behalf are not included since it is the
interest of the general public, rather than the individual citizen, for
which protection is sought. But the ability to bring enforcement
actions on behalf of the State or breach of trust actions against the
State allows the concerned citizen an opportunity to assert his or her
equitable interest and ensure that the duties of the State are fully
performed. 121 Again, this enforcement provision does not vary greatly
from the enforcement available through the statutes discussed above.122
The express reference to money damages allows the State and
private citizens to seek recompense for damages already done. This
provision is not dissimilar to that now available through the Pollu-
tion Control Act.122 While the injunction will continue to provide
a major means of preventing harm, money damages allows the court
to correct previous damage. In addition, the threat of money damages
may encourage potential polluters to exercise greater care in their
treatment of the environment. The trust fund established in the Pollu-
the present generation and that of future generations. See In re S&F Builders, Inc., 60
Pa. D&C 2d 115, 133-34 (Pa. Env. Hearing Bd. 1972) (builders required to show that
the social or economic benefits of altering a stream channel outweighed the environ-
mental harm to present and future generations).
120. For a discussion of the advantages offered by such general terms, see Frye,
supra note 3, at 50036.
121. See 1 V. YANNACONE & B. COHEN, supra note 32, at 34.
122. In particular see text accompanying notes 50-92 supra.
123. See text accompanying notes 113-115 supra.
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tion Control Act could serve as the fund mentioned in the proposed
provision.""
Once damages are paid into the designated trust, the defendant
will presumably have available the defense of res judicata. The EPA
and APA provide similar bars.125 Subsequent suits based on the same
set of facts will probably be barred. 2 6 Additionally, many private
citizens will be discouraged from bringing suits since damages are
payable not directly to them, but, rather, to a Stateheld trust.
However, the provision for money damages, as well as the other
provisions of the proposal, is not intended to supersede existing en-
vironmental statutes and regulations. Rather, the proposed revision
should supplement present environmental protections. Citizens may
still sue polluters for recompense of private injury, but public en-
vironmental interests would gain additional protection.
The proposal also allows more immediate access to the courts for
failure of the State to perform its duties with respect to the environ-
ment.1 27 While the administrative process will still be operative and
APA will still offer a major means of public input into the making of
decisions, the government's violation of its environmental trust duties
will warrant citizen suits for breach of these duties. The proposal may
also ensure that a broad group of citizens retain the necessary standing
to participate in the administrative process.
The protections currently available for Florida's environment
would be both reinforced and enhanced by adoption of the proposed
provision. Such a provision is not an entirely new idea-several states
have already enacted such constitutional provisions. The provision's
protections are not dissimilar from that currently available through
statutes. However, constitutional recognition of a right to a healthful
environment would place that right among the fundamental precepts
of the State of Florida. The means to enforce that right would also be
given major import. Long term protection of the environment would
be ensured by the relative permanence of a constitutional provision.
Protections would emphasize not only immediate needs but also the
124. FLA. STAT. § 403.165(2) (1975).
125. Id. §§ 403.412(4), 120.69(1) & (3).
126. The doctrine of res judicata is that valid judgments are conclusive as to: (1) the
facts litigated, (2) the parties and their privies in all other actions. See Cole v. First
Development Corp. of America, 339 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). Florida
citizens suing under the proposed revision should be considered in privity with one
another-their common interest in the environment is joint and inseparable. Therefore,
one Florida citizen would be barred from bringing additional suits under the revision
based on a set of facts which were litigated in an earlier suit.
127. The proposal is thus consistent with the policy of access to courts set out in
the constitution. See FLA, CONsr. art. I, § 21.
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environmental rights of future generations. Reparations for environ-
mental damages would make repair of damage already done more
possible. Legal protection of the environment would advance signifi-
cantly.
MARTHA L. HARRELL
